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Know-How, Intellectualism, and Memory Systems 
 
Abstract: A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between know-that and 
know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist” view is so entrenched in folk psychology 
that it is often invoked in support of an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit 
and implicit memory derived from the so-called “standard model of memory”. In the last 
two decades, the received philosophical view has been challenged by an “intellectualist” 
view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the traditional anti-intellectualist view have 
turned to the cognitive science of memory, and to the standard model in particular, to 
defend their view. In this paper, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon 
closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience of memory does 
not support the anti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard model of memory 
is likely wrong. But this need not be interpreted as good news for the intellectualist, for it 
is not clear that the empirical evidence necessarily supports their view either. I argue that, 
currently, the philosophical debate is couched in terms that do not correspond to categories 
in psychological science. As a result, the debate has to either be re-interpreted in a 
vocabulary that is amenable to experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settled empirically.  
 
Key words: Knowing-how, Knowing-that, Intellectualism, Declarative Memory, 
Procedural Memory. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a long-established view in philosophy according to which knowing-how is 
a fundamentally different kind of cognitive state from knowing-that. Traditionally, 
philosophers hold this to be a conceptual distinction, for when we say, truthfully, of S, that 
she knows that p, we are at the very least asserting a relationship between S and a true 
proposition, p. For example, if I say, of Laura, that she knows that the capital of Venezuela 
is Caracas, I am at the very least asserting that there is a relationship between Laura and 
the true proposition stating the fact that Caracas is the capital of Venezuela. By contrast, 
when we say, truthfully, of S, that she knows how to q, we need not be asserting that there 
is a relationship between S and a true proposition, q, for knowing q is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for S to know how to q. For example, if I say, of Joaquin, that he knows how to 
dance salsa, I need not be saying of him that there is a true proposition he is related to in 
virtue of which my know-how attribution holds. Joaquin need not know what salsa is, or 
how it sounds; he may not even need to know that he is dancing salsa when he does it. He 
may just know how to dance salsa even if he does not know that he’s dancing salsa. As a 
result, it has been customary to say that while knowledge-that is a species of propositional 
knowledge, knowledge-how is not. This view, often known as anti-intellectualism about 
knowing-how (henceforth, anti-intellectualism), tends to be attributed to Gilbert Ryle, who 
sought to “prove that knowledge-how cannot be defined in terms of knowledge-that and 
further, that knowledge-how is a concept logically prior to the concept of knowledge-that” 
(1945/1946, p. 4; see also, Ryle, 1949, Ch. 2).    
Anti-intellectualism stands in contrast to intellectualism about knowing-how which, 
in its most general form, holds that knowledge-that and knowledge-how are not 
fundamentally different kinds of cognitive states (Fantl, 2008). A particular version of 
intellectualism, which Wallis (2008) dubbed neo-reductionist intellectualism (but I’ll just 
call intellectualism here), has been put forth by Jason Stanley (e.g., Stanley & Williamson, 
2001; Stanley, 2011a, 2011b). According to this view, knowing-how and knowing-that are 
not different kinds of cognitive states because, in fact, knowing-how is a sub-species of 
knowing-that (Stanley, 2011a). More precisely, knowing-how is reducible to propositional 
knowledge because, viz., to know how to q is equivalent to, first, knowing that there is a 
way to do q, and second, knowing it in just the right way, i.e., under a practical mode of 
presentation.   
Since its proposal, there have been a number of arguments against this novel 
intellectualist view. Some of these arguments, though, are grounded not on a priori 
discussions about the very concepts of know-how and know-that, but on empirical findings 
from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Specifically, a number of philosophers have 
argued that intellectualism cannot be true because, as a matter of fact, knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that are two different kinds of cognitive states supported by entirely different 
cognitive systems. Proponents of this empirical argument latch onto scientific findings 
purportedly supporting the so-called standard model of memory (SMM), according to 
which declarative or explicit memory—i.e., a kind of long-term memory that depends on 
consciousness and is expressed through reports or declarations—is an entirely different 
cognitive and neural system from non-declarative, implicit or procedural memory—i.e., a 
kind of long-term memory that does not depend on consciousness and is expressed through 
performance (Squire, 1988). Since, allegedly, know-that depends on declarative memory 
alone, and know-how (which they equate to knowledge of skills) depends solely on 
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procedural memory, then as a matter of empirical fact knowing-how and knowing-that are 
fundamentally different cognitive states, and the former cannot be reduced to the latter. 
In the current paper I challenge this empirical argument against intellectualism. 
Specifically, I question the scientific evidence that has been marshalled in support of the 
distinction between declarative and procedural memory and argue that, upon closer 
scrutiny, much of the neuropsychological, behavioral and neural evidence that allegedly 
supports the fact that know-that and know-how are independent is either misconstrued or 
incomplete. Additionally, I survey new empirical findings that help to strengthen the case 
that there is no clear distinction between declarative and procedural memory, further 
weakening the claim that know-that and know-how are distinct. I do so in Section 4, after 
briefly outlining the main tenets on the intellectualist view (Section 2), and then carefully 
articulating the empirical argument against intellectualism and its reliance on the SMM 
(Section 3). However, my response to the empirical argument against intellectualism 
should not be considered a defense of intellectualism, because—as I argue in Section 5—
it is not clear that the empirical evidence supports intellectualism either. I further argue that 
the know-how/know-that distinction, as it is employed in philosophy, does not map onto 
the distinction between declarative knowledge of facts and procedural knowledge of skills, 
as it is employed by scientists. At the end, I explore some consequences of this mismatch 
of distinctions for the intellectualism/anti-intellectualism debate. 
 
2. Stanley’s Intellectualism  
Stanley’s argument for (neo-reductionist) intellectualism is two-tiered. The first tier is 
linguistic (Stanley and Williamson, 2001). It begins by pointing out that contemporary 
defenders of Ryle’s anti-intellectualism rely on superficial syntactic differences between 
sentences expressing know-how, e.g., 
(1) Joaquin knows how to dance salsa 
and sentences expressing know-that, e.g.,  
(2) Laura knows that Caracas is the capital of Venezuela 
to argue for a fundamental distinction between these two kinds of knowledge (e.g., Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen, 1991). However, Stanley and Williamson point out that according to 
current syntactic theory, there are only two relevant syntactic differences between 
sentences like (1) and (2), viz., unlike the latter, the former contains embedded questions 
and are untensed. But, they argue, both features are amenable to be treated in terms of 
know-that. Put it simply, they show how strikingly similar sentences like (1) are to other 
know-wh- sentences with embedded questions, such as 
(3) Efraín knows where to find churros. 
(4) María knows when to press the button. 
(5) Salomé knows why she’s here. 
which, as it happens, are all amenable to be rendered in canonical know-that forms 
(Stanley, 2011a), i.e., 
(3*) For some place p, Efraín knows that he can find churros at place p. 
(4*) For some time t, María knows that she can press the button at time t. 
(5*) For some reason r, Salomé knows that she is here for reason r.  
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Ditto, then, for (1): 
(1*) For some way w, Joaquín knows that he can dance salsa in way w. 
Rendering (1-4) as (1*-4*) is not sufficient, though, for under a certain reading it 
may be possible to interpret a sentence such as (3*) as being true, while reading (3) to be 
false. For instance, Efraín may well know, of p, that it is a place to find churros, but he may 
not know how to get there; he may—to put it differently—know de re, but not de se, that 
he can find churros at p (Lewis, 1979). Thus, to make (3) and (3*) equivalent it is also 
necessary that Efraín knows that one can find churros at p in the right way, that is, under 
the right mode of presentation. The same goes then for times, t, in (4*), reasons, r, in (5*), 
and, importantly, for ways, w, in (6*), which are to be known under a practical mode of 
presentation. Stanley (2011a, 2011b; also Stanley and Williamson, 2001) acknowledges 
that it is not easy to fully articulate what a practical mode of presentation is, but—he 
claims—it is not less easy to articulate than other, less controversial ones, such as 
demonstrative modes of presentation, which are required to grasp indexical thoughts 
involving ‘I’ or ‘here’.   
 Now, the second tier of the argument moves from language to world, for Stanley 
wants to claim that his “view of the nature of knowing how to do something is a view about 
the metaphysical nature of these states, and not a view in semantics” (Stanley, 2011a: 143), 
even if he develops it by way of investigating the linguistic properties of knowledge 
ascriptions. And the metaphysical conclusion he draws from the linguistic fact that the 
semantics of know-wh- and know-how ascriptions are unified, and the further fact that all 
are analyzable in terms of know-that, is that there are no metaphysical differences between 
states of knowing-how and states of knowing-that. More precisely, he argues that, as a 
matter of fact, knowing-how and knowing-that are not different kinds of cognitive states, 
but rather knowing-how is a species or a sub-class of the more general kind of propositional 
knowledge or know-that.1  
(Before we continue, let me emphasize that in the current paper I am concerned 
only with Stanley’s version of neo-reductionist intellectualism. In addition to Stanley’s, 
there are currently other arguments for intellectualism that do not rely on linguistic 
structure but, rather, on the connection between skilled action, intention, and propositional 
knowledge  (e.g., Pavese, 2015a, 2015b, 2018). As far as I can see, nothing of what I say 
in the current paper affects this other version of intellectualism).  
 
3. The empirical argument  
 In the last decade, Stanley’s intellectualism has been challenged. Some challenges 
deal with the first tier of his argument, either by contending that there are other syntactic 
differences between know-wh and know-how ascriptions (e.g., Hornsby, 2017), or by 
arguing that the notion of a practical mode of presentation is particularly problematic (e.g., 
Glick, 2015). I have nothing to say about this family of arguments. The ones that interest 
me are those that challenge the second tier of the intellectualist argument on empirical 
grounds. More precisely, my interest is in an argumentative line put forth by a number of 
                                               
1 Stanley’s argument need not be read as two-tiered. One could read it as inferring—from the linguistic analysis, and 
from the view that the semantics for know-how ascriptions delivers their truth conditions—that the truth-makers of such 
ascriptions are cognitive states of propositional knowledge. This reconstruction is probably accurate too. My rendition 
simply wants to leave open the possibility that one’s commitments to the truth-conditions of our know-how ascriptions 
need not carry ontological weight (I discuss this possibility for propositional attitudes in De Brigard, 2015).  
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philosophers according to which intellectualism cannot be true because, as a matter of 
empirical fact, knowledge-how and knowledge-that are two different kinds of cognitive 
states supported by entirely different cognitive systems.  
 To buttress this empirical argument, philosophers make use of behavioral and 
neuroscientific evidence purportedly showing a clear double dissociation between a 
cognitive/neural system dedicated to encoding, storing and retrieving declarative 
memories, and a cognitive/neural system dedicated to encoding, storing and retrieving non-
declarative procedural memories. The next step in the empirical argument is to assert, often 
without much argument, that knowledge-that is either equivalent to—or, at best, depends 
solely on—declarative memory, whereas knowledge-how is tantamount to—or at best is 
supported only by—procedural memory. Consequently, partisans of the empirical 
argument conclude that intellectualism cannot be true, because as a matter of empirical fact 
knowing-how and knowing-that are two different cognitive states, resulting from two 
distinct cognitive and neural processes. As such, the former cannot be reduced to the latter.  
 
3.1. A closer look at the empirical argument 
 In one of the first uses of the empirical argument, Wallis (2008) asserts that the 
beliefs Stanley and Williamson (2001) demand of us in order to have knowledge-how are 
likely not needed, as evidenced by “the abilities of brain damaged patients to gain 
knowledge-how despite lacking the ability to form new declarative beliefs” (Wallis, 2008: 
140). In support of this claim he cites empirical evidence purportedly demonstrating that 
individuals with bilateral hippocampal damage—of which patient H.M. is the paradigmatic 
case—“show a normal or near-normal learning curve” in tasks that involve motor and 
perceptual skills “despite being unable to form new declarative beliefs” (Wallis, 2008: 
133). He further bolsters this assertion by citing a number of classic papers discussing some 
of the early behavioral and neuroscientific evidence that constituted the backbone of the 
SMM: an influential framework according to which short-term and long-term memory are 
different systems, with the latter in turn being sub-divided into declarative and non-
declarative subsystems (Figure 1)2. The double dissociation between declarative and non-
declarative memory proves, according to Wallis, that Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) 
intellectualism is “clearly and demonstrably false”, because of  
…the fact that the brain areas operant in the elicitation and generation of such 
contextually reliable complexes of dispositions are strongly dissociable from 
areas of the brain responsible for propositional knowledge. Neurological evidence 
regarding such behavior clearly implicates areas of the brain other than those 
associated with propositional knowledge (hippocampus and inferior temporal 
lobe) in the causal generation of such behavior (e.g. the basal ganglia and the 
motor areas). (Wallis, 2008: 141)  
In turn, this dissociation is supposed to give reason to reject the reduction of knowledge-
how to propositional knowledge, since this claim “has always, and rightly, been understood 
                                               
2 To the best of my knowledge, the first time Squire published his now famous diagram, the main split occurred between 
declarative and procedural memory, which in turn he sub-divided into skills, priming, simple classical conditioning, and 
other (Squire, 1986). Two years later, and perhaps in an attempt to unify the vocabulary employed by other researchers 
that contributed to perfect the model, procedural memory became a sub-class of non-declarative memory, covering motor, 
perceptual and cognitive skills (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1988). Figure 1 is based on Squire and Zola-Morgan’s 1991 
diagram, in which procedural memory is now simply called memory for skills and habits.  
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as requiring that (1) The knowledge itself be propositional knowledge or at least encoded 
explicitly as particular linguistic or quasi-linguistic expressions that were (2) causally 
operant in the manifestation of the knowledge.” (Wallis, 2008: 141). 
 Devitt (2011) added his voice to the empirical argument by reviewing human and 
non-human animal research purportedly demonstrating, once again, a double dissociation 
between declarative and procedural memory:    
[T]he psychological distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge, 
and the related distinctions about memory and learning, are well established in 
empirical science. As one researcher says, the evidence for them “lies in 
experimental data that elucidate various dissociations and differences in 
performance under different conditions.” [Sun, Merrill, and Peterson, 2001] And 
all of this is evidence for the nature of, near enough, the folk distinction between 
knowledge-that and knowledge-how. […] So, if the psychologists are right and 
procedural knowledge does not involve declarative knowledge, then declarative 
knowledge is not essential to knowledge-how. (Devitt, 2011: 212). 
Once again, we find the SMM, and the purported double dissociation between declarative 
and procedural memory, being used as empirical evidence for the claim that knowledge-
that and knowledge-how are two entirely different cognitive states. This evidence, as Devitt 
concludes, “is very bad news for [Stanley and Williamson, 2001]. Knowledge-that is 
declarative knowledge. So, psychology shows that procedural knowledge, hence 
knowledge-how, does not require knowledge-that, precisely what [Stanley and 
Williamson’s] Intellectualism claims it does require. Despite disagreement or uncertainty 
on many other issues, psychologists speak with one voice on this one.” (Devitt, 2011: 213). 
 The empirical argument is endorsed by Glick (2011) too, when he asserts that 
“empirical investigation reveals many cases in which creatures possess and exercise 
knowledge-how but do not possess or appeal to any propositional knowledge-that could 
constitute the relevant knowledge-how, so knowledge-how cannot be propositional 
knowledge.” (Glick, 2011: 400). Once again, the kind of “empirical investigation” he 
alludes to comes from research employed in support of the SMM. For instance, he asserts 
that “data from cases of amnesia have provided much of the justification for the long-
standing view in psychology that procedural memory or knowledge is not a kind of 
declarative memory or knowledge. […As] paradigm cases of procedural and declarative 
knowledge map onto paradigm cases of know-how and ordinary knowledge-that, 
respectively” (Glick, 2011: 401). He even supports the claim that the 
declarative/procedural memory distinction is tantamount to the knowledge-
that/knowledge-how distinction on account that “some well-known articles in the cognitive 
science literature have explicitly equated the categories” (referring to Cohen and Squire’s 
1980 paper, which I discuss below). In a nod to Wallis (2008), Glick concludes:  
[N]eurological evidence from studies of memory impairment strongly indicates 
that the exercise of procedural knowledge and of various sorts of know-how 
involves brain areas dissociable from the hippocampus and medial or inferior 
temporal lobe, the brain areas associated with declarative knowledge. […] Thus, 
from a scientific point of view it is a well-supported empirical hypothesis that 
there are two sorts of knowledge, one more practical and skill-related and one 
more closely tied to ordinary knowledge of facts. Wallis equates the latter with 
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‘‘propositional knowledge’’, inferring that even if an agent has such knowledge, 
it need not be ‘‘causally operant in the manifestation of [knowledge-how]’’, 
contrary to the Intellectualist thesis that one’s knowledge of facts plays some 
crucial role in the exercise of know-how.[…] The case from cognitive science, in 
essence, is that empirical data shows that know-how can be possessed and 
exercised even when there is reason to doubt that propositional knowledge is 
present. (Glick, 2011: 402) 
Finally, we find yet another endorsement of the empirical argument against 
intellectualism, in a more recent paper by Brown (2013). In it, Brown argues that if 
Stanley’s intellectualism is really stating something about the nature of knowing-how, 
rather than merely about the language of its ascriptions, then “we need to appeal to science 
to determine whether ‘knowing-how’ refers to a natural kind of knowledge, [and to] the 
best scientific characterization of its nature and its relation to other kinds of knowledge” 
(Brown, 2013: 223). She then latches onto behavioral and neuroscientific evidence put 
forth in support of the SMM to claim that “procedural knowledge is not a subspecies of 
declarative knowledge, [and] if procedural knowledge were to be identified with knowing-
how and declarative knowledge were to be identified with propositional knowledge, then 
knowing-how would not be a subspecies of propositional knowledge.” (Brown, 2013: 224) 
As such, she concludes:  
[F]rom the perspective of his naturalist critics, Stanley’s reconciliation of 
intellectualism with cognitive science would be seen as an admission that the 
category of propositional knowledge does not carve the psychological categories 
at the joints, and that knowing-how is importantly different from cases of 
declarative knowledge traditionally understood as paradigms of propositional 
knowledge. (Brown, 2013: 225). 
Taken together, and for the sake of simplicity, the variations of the empirical argument I 
just reviewed (but see also Adams, 2009; Fridland, 2017; Levy, 2017, for more examples) 
can be captured in the following canonical form: 
Empirical Argument 
P1.  If knowledge-how is a subspecies of knowledge-that, then there is no fundamental 
difference in the kind of mental states they are.  
P2. Knowledge-how is equivalent to (or, at least, exclusively depends on) procedural 
memory, whereas knowledge-that is equivalent to (or, at least, exclusively depends 
on) declarative memory.  
P3.  But the scientific evidence captured by the SMM demonstrates that procedural and 
declarative memory are two entirely dissociable and independent systems.  
P4. Therefore, there is a fundamental difference in kind between knowledge-how and  
knowledge-that (P2, P3). 
C.  Therefore, it is not the case that knowledge-how is a sub-species of knowledge-that. 
(Modus Tollens, P4, P1) 
In the remainder of this paper I argue that the empirical argument is unsound. The 
first step—in section 4—is to show that P3 is false, as a closer look at the available 
empirical evidence reveals that the procedural and declarative memory systems are not 
fully dissociable and independent. Then, in section 5, I argue, first, that said evidence need 
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not support intellectualism either and, second, that the best account of the available 
empirical data is such that the relationship between knowledge-how and procedural 
memory, and knowledge-that and declarative memory, is neither equivalence nor exclusive 
dependency, which in turn contradicts P2. But first, it is worth clarifying what the SMM is 
and what is the evidence in its favor. 
3.2. The standard model of memory (SMM) 
What has come to be known as the SMM was initially suggested over 30 years ago 
as a “tentative taxonomy of memory” 3 (Squire, 1986; see footnote 2 above). Ever since, 
some version of Figure 1 became a must in pretty much every introductory textbook on 
memory. Why is this model so influential and (seemingly) widely accepted in the scientific 
community? My sense is that there are both scientific and sociological reasons, the latter 
having to do with the stature of its main proponent in the neuroscientific community. My 
main concern here, though, is with the scientific reasons, which led to the belief that the 
SMM was the best fit for the available evidence unveiled by research on memory and 
learning in human and non-human animals. Initially, the evidence that the SMM was set to 
account for came from human pathological data. This “neuropsychological-neural systems 
approach”, as Squire called it, was later supplemented with further behavioral and 
developmental evidence from human and non-human animals (Squire, 1992). For the 
purposes of the present paper, however, non-human evidence is going to be less relevant, 
given the difficulties inherent in understanding the parallels between declarative memory 
in human and non-human animals. As such, two main lines of evidence for the SMM are 
critical for the purposes of understanding P3: neural and behavioral evidence from 
neuropathological patients and neural and behavioral evidence from healthy controls.  
[Figure 1] 
3.2.1. Evidence from neuropathological individuals 
No other patient has been as influential for the study of human memory as Henry 
Molaison, or H.M., as was known until his death in 2008. In 1953, at the age of 27, and 
after a history of severe epilepsy, William Scoville performed a surgical procedure on H.M. 
whereby both hippocampi and much of the surrounding medial-temporal lobe (MTL) areas 
were removed. Four years later, the first post-operative neuropsychological profile of H.M. 
was published by Scoville and Milner (1957). In it, we were told that H.M.’s IQ improved 
slightly after the surgery (from 104 to 112) and that “an extensive test battery failed to 
reveal any deficits in perception, abstract thinking, or reasoning ability” (p. 17), whereas 
his memory quotient—as measured by Wechsler Memory Scale (Wechsler, 1945)—was 
very low. It was also reported that while H.M. exhibited complete anterograde amnesia 
(i.e., incapacity to remember any events that occurred after the surgery), he revealed only 
partial retrograde amnesia for the three years prior to the surgery. 
                                               
3  The idea that there are different kinds of memory is not new. At least since Aristotle, both philosophers and 
psychologists have argued for different kinds of memory (De Brigard, 2014a; Michaelian and Sutton, 2017). Memory 
taxonomies that aimed to fit empirical evidence, however, were less common. In this regard, Squire’s SMM was not the 
only model available at that time. Tulving (1985), for instance, had suggested a different, nested model based upon single, 
rather than double, dissociations, whereby episodic memory depended (i.e., phylogenetically, ontogenetically, and 
causally) upon semantic memory, which in turn depended (i.e., phylogenetically, ontogenetically, and causally) upon 
procedural memory. Nevertheless, the SMM prevailed, despite its strong commitments to double dissociations, in part—
I think—because it was better suited to fit non-human animal evidence, while also accommodating the evidence 
accounted for by Tulving’s model (for an opinionated historical review, see Squire, 2004).   
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In the following years, H.M.’s neuropsychological profile became more precise 
(Milner, Corkin and Teuber, 1968). We were informed, for instance, that his performance 
in tests that involved reasoning with spatial relationships was within normal ranges, as was 
his performance in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which is typically employed to 
measure executive control and strategic planning. It was reported also that H.M. performed 
normally in several perceptual tasks, including detection of anomalous features in cartoon 
drawings, tachistoscopic letter recognition, Mooney face perception tasks, and 
metacontrast masking, among others. Moreover, we were also told that H.M.’s language 
and working memory, as measured by digit-span recall, were preserved. Such evidence 
fueled the claim, central to the SMM, that all these cognitive capacities—i.e., perception, 
working memory, language, abstract reasoning, problem solving—are independent of the 
hippocampus and surrounding areas in the MTL. 
Critically, several post-operatory studies on H.M. seemed to reveal that not all 
learning was lost, for apparently he was able to acquire new motor skills. At least, this is 
the notion with which researchers traditionally refer to the kind of learning preserved post-
surgically in H.M. The first observation to this effect was reported by Milner (1962), who 
documented H.M.’s reduction in errors within and across block-trials on a mirror-tracing 
task. A more comprehensive set of experiments was reported soon after (Corkin, 1968), 
stating that H.M. was able to improve performance on three motor-learning tasks: rotary 
pursuit, bimanual tracking, and tapping. Further tests suggested that H.M. was also able to 
learn perceptual skills, the term employed to categorize a family of tasks including prism 
adaptation, mirror-reversed words reading and repetition-priming (Gabrieli, 1998).     
The observation that perceptual skill learning is preserved in individuals with MTL 
damage was further supported by consistent results involving similar studies with different 
amnesic patients (e.g., Cermak et al., 1985; Graf et al, 1984; Moscovitch, 1982; Warrington 
and Weiskrantz, 1974). More importantly, it seemed as though both perceptual and skill 
learning were preserved in amnesic patients regardless of the etiology of their impairment. 
In one of the most influential pieces of evidence in favor of the SMM, Cohen and Squire 
(1980) reported equivalent performance in a number of motor, perceptual, and priming-
based skill tasks on eight amnesic patients with three different etiologies: injury, alcohol-
induced Korsakoff syndrome, and after-effect of electro-convulsive therapy. The 
consistency of these findings, involving different individuals with diverse etiologies, 
suggested that our capacity to memorize new factual and episodic information—which all 
patients were severely impaired on—is independent from our capacity to learn new skills—
which all patients had preserved. Moreover, it also suggested that skill learning did not 
depend on the hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas, giving researchers further reason 
to suspect that these two kinds of memory—declarative and procedural—are subserved by 
two independent and dissociable neural systems:  
This distinction between procedural or rule-based information and declarative or 
data-based information, which is reminiscent of the classical distinction between 
“knowing how” and “knowing that”, has been the subject of considerable 
discussion in the literature of cognition and artificial intelligence. The 
experimental findings described here provide evidence that such a distinction is 
honored by the nervous system. (Cohen and Squire, 1980: 209)    
These findings alone do not support the independence of systems postulated by the 
SMM; at best, they support only a single dissociation between declarative versus short-
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term and non-declarative memories. Nevertheless, partisans of the SMM hold that evidence 
for double dissociation is also available. Traditionally, the neuropsychological evidence 
used to support the claim that short and long-term memory systems are independent comes 
from the study of patient K.F., who exhibited profound deficits in auditory verbal short-
term memory while having no deficits in declarative memory at all (Warrington and 
Shallice, 1969). To the best of our knowledge, K.F.’s brain damage spared the 
hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas, as it seem to have affected only his left parieto-
occipital cortex. Years later, Sullivan and Sagar (1991) offered evidence of double 
dissociation of short-term and long-term memory for non-verbal material by comparing 
H.M.’s performance to that of 14 patients with Parkinson’s disease—a brain condition that 
affects the striatum while sparing the MTL. Their results revealed that while H.M. 
exhibited normal performance in short-term but not in long-term recognition of non-verbal 
material, the patients with Parkinson’s disease showed the opposite pattern of results.  
 As for neuropsychological evidence of impairments in non-declarative memory 
with sparing of declarative memory, researchers traditionally invoke cases like patient 
M.S., who also underwent neurosurgery to alleviate intractable epilepsy, but had only right 
occipital regions removed (Gabrieli et al., 1995). After the surgery, M.S. scored within 
normal ranges in standardized tests of attention, memory, language, and reasoning. 
However, when compared to both controls and individuals with MTL amnesia, M.S. 
showed no effects of visual priming. Similarly, impairments in motor skill learning with 
unimpaired declarative memory are reported in patients with basal ganglia disorders—such 
as Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease—as they tend to show marked difficulties with 
the serial reaction time (SRT) task, as opposed to individuals with MTL amnesia who show 
normal performance (Clark et al., 2014). Finally, regarding so-called cognitive skills, 
functional dissociations between amnesic individuals and patients with Parkinson’s disease 
have been reported. For instance, Knowlton and colleagues (1996) showed that while 
individuals with MTL amnesia were able to learn a probabilistic task known as the weather 
prediction task, patients with Parkinson’s disease never mastered it. However, in a 
recognition test, Parkinson’s patients performed on par with controls, while individuals 
with amnesia were severely impaired.  
3.2.2. Evidence from healthy individuals 
Although most of the human evidence for the SMM comes from pathological cases, 
some behavioral and neuroimaging results have also been marshalled in its support. For 
instance, early neuroimaging studies contrasting retention for short and long-term intervals 
showed preferential engagement of hippocampus for long-term memory, whereas pre-
frontal activity was associated with short-term memory (D’Esposito et al., 2000; Talmi et 
al., 2005). More relevant for our current purposes are experiments purporting to reveal 
functional dissociations between declarative and non-declarative memory. In the early 
1980s, a number of studies showed that manipulating depth of encoding of target items—
e.g., focusing on the meaning of a word (deep encoding) versus its font (shallow 
encoding)— affected only explicit recognition tests, as priming performance was 
unaffected (e.g., Jacoby and Dallas, 1981). Soon after, Weldon and Roediger (1987) 
elegantly demonstrated the modal specificity of these priming effects by testing 
participants with word-completion and free-recall tasks after presenting them with both 
pictures and words. Their results indicated that while free-recall of pictures was better than 
for words, word-completion was better for words than for pictures. However, when the 
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implicit test included picture-completion tasks, priming for pictures was evident. These 
and similar studies have been interpreted as evidence that modality and levels of processing 
(e.g., deep vs shallow encoding) differentially affect explicit tests of declarative memory 
versus implicit tests of non-declarative perceptual priming. Such differences in processing 
are thought to provide indirect evidence of distinct neural and cognitive mechanisms 
engaged in episodic versus perceptual priming tasks (Schacter, Chiu, and Ochsner, 1993). 
Dissociations between episodic memory and both conceptual and semantic priming 
have been documented, too.4  In an influential fMRI study, for instance, Wagner and 
collaborators (2000) showed preferential involvement of left inferior prefrontal cortex 
during conceptual as opposed to perceptual priming with the same set of stimuli. 
Importantly, the MTL did not seem to be preferentially involved in either of these tasks. 
Likewise, semantic priming—which is typically shown by increased speed and response 
accuracy for words or pictures preceded by semantically related (e.g., “envelope-letter”) 
relative to semantically unrelated (e.g., “broccoli-letter”) primes—has been associated with 
activity in lateral but not MTL regions, which are involved in episodic memory (Rossell et 
al., 2003). Of note, the behavioral effects of accuracy and speed, as well as the neural 
effects just mentioned, occur not only in healthy individuals but also in individuals with 
amnesia, including H.M. and K.C. (Tulving and Schacter, 1990). Together, these and 
related results suggest that both conceptual and semantic priming recruit regions outside 
the MTL system, upon which—according to the SMM—declarative memory depends.   
Finally, a number of studies in healthy individuals have also reported functional 
dissociations between declarative and procedural memory. As with neuropsychological 
patients, one of the most widely studied motor sequence learning tasks is the serial reaction 
time (SRT). In a typical version of this task, participants see four screen locations, and four 
response keys that may mimic the spatial arrangement on the screen. On each trial, a 
stimulus appears in one of the locations of the screen, and the subject is asked to respond 
with the corresponding key. Trials are usually grouped in blocks of ten or twelve, and 
accuracy and response times are measured. Critically, the stimuli on the screen appear 
following a particular sequence repeated from block to block, and normally participants’ 
reaction times become faster as the task progresses even though they are unaware of the 
recurring sequence. Consistent with results from neuropathological populations, several 
neuroimaging studies with healthy individuals have shown preferential engagement of 
premotor and supplementary motor cortices, as well as basal ganglia and cerebellum, 
during variants of the SRT (Hardwick et al., 2013). By contrast, motor adaptation tasks 
seem to be more reliant on posterior parietal activity, as its disruption via transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) impairs performance (Della-Maggiore et al., 2004).    
Perceptual skill learning in healthy populations has also been associated with 
regions outside the MTL. In a classic study, Poldrack and collaborators (1998) showed 
changes in neural activation in occipital, inferior temporal, superior parietal and cerebellar 
regions as a function of learning a mirror reading task. Soon after, Gauthier et al. (1999) 
reported an association between increased expertise in perceptual categorization of 
                                               
4 Unlike perceptual priming, which is measured by the increased probability of responding with the same target item as 
the prime when perceptual features are manipulated (e.g., both seeing and responding “envelope” in a word-completion 
task like “e_v_l_p_”), conceptual priming refers to the increased probability of responding with the same target item as 
the prime when the manipulation is conceptual (e.g., responding “envelope” in a recognition test more readily after 
reading about mail than about food). By contrast, semantic priming is understood as the increased probability of 
responding, not with the same item as the prime, but with a semantically related one.   
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objects—both real and non-real (e.g., greebles)—and neural activity in the right fusiform 
area. As for cognitive skill learning, researchers have also employed fMRI adapted 
versions of the weather prediction task, the learning of which seems to increase activity in 
basal ganglia. However, when combined with a pair-associate task, recognition shows 
increased activity in the MTL (Poldrack et al., 2001). This pattern of results is consistent 
with the dissociation, discussed in the previous section, whereby patients with Parkinson’s 
disease show poor performance in the weather prediction task but intact recognition of pair-
associates, while individuals with MTL amnesia show the opposite pattern. 
Taken together, the scientific evidence I just summarily reviewed has traditionally 
been used in support of the SMM, as it is taken to demonstrate clear double dissociations 
between, first, short-term and long-term memory and, second, declarative and non-
declarative memory. Moreover, these results have also been taken as evidence that the 
hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas are uniquely involved in declarative memory, 
whereas non-declarative memory depends upon distinct brain regions, such as the basal 
ganglia, and motor and sensory cortices for skill learning and priming (Squire 1988; 
Gabrieli, 1998). However, as I argue in the next section, a closer inspection of both old and 
new findings clearly suggests that the evidence is mixed, and that the SMM is a poor fit 
for a significant number of critical results.  
 
4. Against the empirical argument  
In this section I discuss three sets of findings and argue that they offer 
counterevidence against the SMM. First, I argue that if we look closely at H.M.’s actual 
performance, the picture that emerges does not correspond to the textbook description of 
his neuropsychological profile. Second, I review some newer findings from 
neuropathological populations that also contradict some of the main tenets of the SMM. 
Finally, I survey a number of recent behavioral and neuroimaging findings that are difficult 
to fit within the standard model. The picture that emerges is one in which the SMM turns 
out to be an inaccurate representation of the nature of our memory and, more importantly, 
one in which—contra P3—declarative and non-declarative memory are neither fully 
independent nor clearly dissociable. 
4.1. H.M. Revisited 
 The first piece of countervailing evidence is not new: it comes from H.M.’s own 
neuropsychological profile. If one looks closely, the story we learn about H.M.’s 
performance after the surgery, which allegedly fits perfectly with the SMM is, at best, 
selective and, at worst, distorted. Consider the claim that he had no retrograde amnesia. 
According to the initial report (Scoville and Milner, 1957), H.M. exhibited only “partial 
retrograde amnesia for the three years leading up to his operation”, and that “early 
memories [were] seemingly normal” (p.17). However, a few years later this assessment 
was modified, and we were told that his “apparent retrograde loss is becoming increasingly 
difficult to delineate” (Milner, Corkin and Teuber, 1968). Then, employing more precise 
methods to measure autobiographical memory, Corkin and collaborators conducted more 
extensive testing on H.M., and reported that “the new data confirm the finding that H.M.’s 
remote memory impairment is temporally limited, but they extend the limits of the deficit 
back to 1942, 11 years before the medial temporal lobe resection.” (Corkin, 1984: 257). In 
other words, we are told that H.M. conserves no autobiographical memories from the age 
of 16 to the age of 27, when the surgery took place. Almost two decades later, the record 
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was revised yet again. Employing novel approaches to assess the contribution of episodic 
and semantic information to autobiographical memory, Schmolck and colleagues (2002) 
showed that most of the already scarce autobiographical memories from the first 16 years 
of H.M.’s life were semantic and that most likely he only had two episodic autobiographical 
memories: one about his first cigarette and one about a plane ride. Certainly, this is not the 
autobiographical memory of an individual with no retrograde amnesia. More importantly, 
these results strongly suggest, contrary to the SMM, that intact hippocampi are required 
for the retrieval of episodic autobiographical memories.  
 The observation that H.M.’s semantic memory for premorbid facts was preserved 
does not clash with the SMM, since it claims that once consolidated, semantic memories 
do not depend on the hippocampus to be retrieved. What the SMM does claim is that an 
intact hippocampus is required to encode all semantic (as well as episodic) memories. 
Indeed, this is what textbooks typically tell us: that, after the surgery, H.M. was completely 
unable to encode new declarative information, whether episodic or semantic. However, the 
discovery of differential forgetting of episodic relative to semantic autobiographical 
memory motivated researchers to carefully investigate whether H.M. was able to encode 
new semantic information—and the results suggest that he was. Inspired by H.M.’s 
occasional references to current events and TV shows, as well as his capacity to complete 
crosswords whose cues referred to postmorbid facts, Corkin’s group wondered whether the 
bits of post-operative semantic information H.M. was able to retain were learned 
declaratively or non-declaratively. Initial research showed, for instance, that when 
prompted with first names of individuals who reached fame after his surgery (e.g., Ray 
Charles), H.M. would provide the appropriate last name well above chance, suggesting 
some retained association between the first and the last name. This association, though, 
could be explained by non-declarative priming, seemingly preserved in H.M.. But what if 
the association was, not with a simple name, but with a body of knowledge connected with 
such celebrities? The answer to this question was provided by an elegant experiment 
conducted by O’Kane and colleagues in 2004 (Exp. 2). In this experiment, H.M. was shown 
two names, only one of which named a celebrity. His task was simply to identify which 
name named a famous person. H.M.’s performance in this task was on par with controls: 
he correctly identified 92% of the premorbid names, and 88% of the postmorbid ones. 
Critically, after identifying a name as famous, he was asked “why is this person famous?” 
Impressively, H.M. performed no different than controls for premorbid names, and only 
minimally worse than controls for postmorbid ones. In fact, he was able to recall very 
precise information about 12 celebrities that became famous after 1953, and somewhat less 
precise information about a handful more. The researchers interpreted these results as 
evidence against the null hypothesis—consistent with the SMM—that H.M. would be 
unable to retrieve semantic information encoded post-operatively.  
 H.M.’s postmorbid semantic knowledge was also successfully tested with other 
recognition-based strategies (Corkin, 2013, Chapter 11), and the results all pointed to the 
same conclusion: H.M. was still able to learn new semantic facts—although at a much 
slower pace and with more limits than healthy individuals. Nevertheless, this learning 
cannot be accounted for exclusively in terms of priming. Instead, Corkin and collaborators 
argue that H.M.’s preserved capacity to learn new facts is due to semantic memory being 
organized schematically, that is, as related to semantic information already stored in 
memory. H.M. seemed to have been able to generate new associations between new and 
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old semantic information, albeit slowly and less efficiently than controls. Thus, they argue 
that although hippocampi may be needed to facilitate the association between semantic 
information during encoding, it can still occur without them. Critically, this evidence also 
suggests that, contrary to the dogma accepted by the advocates of the SMM and the 
empirical argument against intellectualism, H.M. was still able to learn new facts.  
 Finally—and also crucially for our current purposes—the claim that H.M. showed 
normal skill learning is overblown and imprecise. By 1965, H.M. was tested at least on 
three occasions about his performance on tasks that were supposed to tap skill learning. 
The first, well-known test was reported in 1960 by Brenda Milner using a mirror tracing 
apparatus. H.M. was asked to trace a figure by looking at the reflection of his hand holding 
a pen. H.M. completed a total of 39 trials over the course of three days, showing marked 
improvement as measured by a steady reduction in reaction times and errors. This first 
observation lead Milner to hypothesize that H.M.’s motor skill learning was preserved. But 
in 1965, H.M. was tested on a sequential maze-task—both visually (Milner, 1965) and 
tactually (Corkin, 1965)—with abysmal results. In this task, the subject is given a wooden 
board with metal bolts arranged in a 10 x 10 array, and is asked to find the correct path 
from the lower left corner bolt to the upper right corner bolt using a metal-head stylus by 
touching one bolt at a time. If a bolt is in the right path it would make no noise; if it isn’t, 
it would make a loud click. By trial and error a subject would, eventually, find the right 
path. While controls took on average 17 trials and made approximately 92 errors, H.M. 
was completely unable to learn the path: after 215 trials and 2,877 errors, testing stopped. 
In an attempt to reduce the retrieval effort inherent in the task, Milner and 
colleagues (1968) tested H.M. again with simpler versions of the board: one with a 6 x 4 
array and another with a 5 x 4 array. This last array, according to the researchers, allowed 
the finding of the right path to occur within the span of short-term memory. This 
modification minimized the role of declarative memory in completing the task, thus 
enabling H.M. to non-declaratively encode the motor-sequence path. However, even with 
this simple array, H.M.’s performance was very poor. While controls learned the path in 
less than 20 trials and were able to show errorless performance 24 hours later, H.M. took 
155 trials and had to be brought back to criterion every day after that, for 14 days, until the 
error curve was comparable to controls. Moreover, to further evaluate whether the motor 
sequence was truly learned, a slightly longer maze which included the just-learned path 
was presented to H.M. immediately after session 14 in order to test transfer of learning. 
Contrary to controls, who showed flawless transfer of learning, H.M. showed no evidence 
of transfer at all. Hence, the results from these first three studies suggest that H.M. showed 
improved performance in only one of the three skill-learning tasks he was evaluated with 
(i.e., the mirror-trace task). His performance in all the variations of the motor-sequence 
maze tasks was either null or significantly compromised.  
Corkin was aware of the conflicting evidence regarding H.M.’s alleged capacity to 
learn new skills. As such, she tested him in three different motor-learning tasks: rotary 
pursuit, bimanual tracking, and tapping. As mentioned above, her 1968 report of the results 
is widely cited as showing that H.M. was able to learn all these skills. But a closer 
inspection at the actual data—indeed, a closer reading at Corkin’s own discussion of the 
results—clearly indicates that this conclusion is unwarranted. Consider the first task: rotary 
pursuit. In this task, the subject is asked to hold a metal-head stylus in contact with a target 
point on a rotating metal disk. The objective is to keep the stylus in contact with the target 
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point until the disk stops rotating. Although it is true that H.M.’s mean time on the target 
improved, his performance is significantly worse than that of controls, not only because 
controls are better from the start, but also because their learning curves are markedly 
different (Figure 2A). Specifically, as Corkin remarks, while control subjects’ performance 
improves linearly to optimal performance by session 7, H.M.’s asymptotes on Session 4 at 
half the level of performance of controls. Not knowing the variance in the control group, it 
is hard to tell, but it is likely that if we were to fit regressors to both learning curves, their 
slopes would be significantly different from one another—indeed, is not clear that H.M.’s 
would even be linear. Moreover, the other measure of performance—mean number of 
contacts—was entirely different between H.M. and controls (Figure 2B). While control 
subjects began by making lots of contacts with the target and learned to stay on target for 
longer periods of time, H.M. showed the exact opposite pattern. It is unclear which pattern 
of errors constitutes a better performance on the task; what is unquestionable, though, is 
that H.M.’s behavior here is diametrically different from controls. 
[Figure 2] 
A similar story occurs with H.M.’s performance in bimanual tracking. The 
apparatus for this task consists of one left and one right rotating discs, each containing a 
different “track” of about 1/4 inches, visible through a horizontal slit of about 3/8 inches. 
The subject is asked to hold a stylus with each hand and to keep it in contact with the 
corresponding track while the disc rotates at a rate of  2, 1 or .5 seconds. Corkin only reports 
the results at the .5 seconds rotation, as controls—but not H.M.—reached optimal 
performance very quickly at both 2 and 1 second rotations. Since each trial was 20 seconds 
long, the results depicted in Figure 2C tells us that controls basically hit ceiling (i.e., 
optimal performance) by session 7. (Had error bars been plotted we would probably 
dismiss the slightly lower line as reflecting between-subject noise.) By contrast, H.M. starts 
off at a much lower point than controls, his improvement is erratic and inconsistent, and he 
never reaches optimal performance. More dramatic is the difference in performance as 
measured by the mean number of contacts with the track: while H.M. and control subjects 
start at almost the exact same level, controls reduce the number of contacts with the track 
linearly and steadily from session to session. By contrast, H.M.’s performance is almost 
flat. In fact, his best performance on session 13 is on a par with the second worst 
performance of the control subjects, on session 2. Clearly, H.M.’s performance in bimanual 
tracking is markedly different from controls’. Finally, in tapping, subjects are shown a 
circle divided in sectors and are given a stylus to tap them according to a 4-place sequence. 
Their task is to tap the sectors, in the proper order, as fast as possible. As with the other 
two tasks, H.M.’s reaction times were slower than controls, and significantly more so when 
both hands were tested at the same time. Nevertheless, of the three tasks included in this 
report, tapping is the only one in which H.M.’s performance was equivalent to controls, as 
both improved comparably from test to re-test.  
Taken together, the extant evidence on H.M.’s performance in motor-skill tasks is 
mixed. Only in two tasks—mirror-tracing and tapping—is H.M.’s performance on par with 
controls. In all other tasks H.M. performs significantly worse. Indeed, as Corkin herself 
suggests, it looks as though H.M. performed better in the two tasks that were less 
constrained and required less demanding motor skills. When the tasks demanded better 
motor skills, H.M. either never learned them or never reached the same level of 
performance as controls. But if the evidence about H.M.’s actual performance on motor-
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skill tasks is so conflicting, why are these results taken to suggest that H.M.’s capacity to 
learn motor skills was preserved? Part of the reason is that, traditionally, it has been 
suggested that the discrepancies in H.M.’s performance in motor tasks relative to controls 
were due to general slowness attributable to long-term effects of his anti-epileptic drugs. 
However, this explanation is unsatisfactory for at least three reasons. First, the evidence as 
to whether or not there are significant cognitive effects due to long term anti-epileptic 
treatments is extremely unclear, with some studies suggesting long-term effects for several 
cognitive processes including—but not limited to—motor control, and others suggesting 
no long-term effects at all (Vermeulen and Aldenkamp, 1995). Second, even if there was 
evidence for slowness specific to motor control, this explanation would still be 
unsatisfactory, simply because H.M.’s reaction times were sometimes well within the range 
of that of controls—in fact, some controls were slower than H.M. in the tapping task. And, 
third, even if we account for the alleged sluggishness in his responses, there are other 
measures of performance that are markedly worse in H.M. than in controls.  
So perhaps what happens is that, traditionally, people have been reading more into 
these results than the data actually support. Both Milner and Corkin took their results to 
suggest that H.M. was capable of “acquiring certain motor skills despite a severe 
impairment in learning other kinds of material” (Corkin, 1968: 262). Nevertheless, they 
also repeatedly acknowledged that H.M.’s performance was not equivalent to controls in 
most of the tasks. Indeed, Corkin initially suggested that H.M.’s reduced efficiency in 
certain motor tasks may have been due to his incapacity to recognize the apparatus from 
day to day, as well as his inability to remember his previous performance, so he wouldn’t 
be motivated to improve upon it. Moreover, she suggested then (Corkin, 1968: 264)—but 
also more recently (Corkin, 2013: 159)—that the irregular shifts in the bimanual tracking 
and rotary pursuit tasks may have been hard to predict for H.M., since “this need to 
anticipate the future may have required input from declarative memory” (ibid). 
Consequently, she suggested that H.M.’s severe amnesia and his abnormal performance in 
certain motor tasks were cumulative, not independent, deficits (Corkin, 1968: 264). True, 
neither Milner nor Corkin were in the business of model building: their purpose was to 
generate a precise characterization of H.M.’s neuropsychological profile. Nevertheless, 
neither then (in 1968) nor later (in 2013, that is) when reflecting upon her results was 
Corkin convinced that they perfectly conformed to the SMM. Her cautious hypothesis was 
simply “that different motor skills engage separate cognitive and neural processes, [so it 
is] possible that the particular brain circuit within the striatum recruited for mirror tracing 
would not be necessary to perform a different skill-learning task, such as learning a specific 
sequence of responses” (Corkin, 2013: 163). This claim, though, is very different from 
endorsing a single underlying system for skills. 
In sum, a closer look at the original data strongly suggests that H.M.’s traditional 
textbook neuropsychological profile, which was supposed to support the SMM, is highly 
inaccurate. On the contrary, his performance either conflicts or fails to support the SMM. 
First, H.M. shows profound episodic retrograde amnesia, suggesting—contra the SMM—
that a functioning hippocampus is required for retrieving remote episodic autobiographical 
memories. Second, H.M. was capable of learning new declarative semantic information, 
which the SMM explicitly forbids. Finally, H.M.’s performance in most motor skill 
learning tasks was either null or significantly subpar relative to controls, strongly 
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suggesting—contra the SMM—that his capacity for normal motor skill learning was 
compromised.5  
4.2. Conflicting neuropathological evidence 
Neuropsychological profiles based on single cases are as accurate as the tests 
employed to generate them, and they are almost always nuanced and complex. Fortunately, 
evidence from other neuropathological cases further strengthens the case against the SMM. 
The first piece of evidence concerns the necessity of functioning hippocampi to retrieve 
premorbid episodic autobiographical memories. Recall that, according to the standard 
model, the hippocampus is necessary only for encoding declarative memories. Once 
consolidated, both episodic and semantic memories are retrieved by brain regions outside 
of the hippocampal complex. Evidence for this claim was initially supported by two 
observations: 1) that retrograde amnesia is temporally graded in accordance with Ribot’s 
law (1881)—namely that the more remote a memory is, the more likely it is to survive 
hippocampal damage—and 2) that the severity of retrograde and anterograde amnesias are 
correlated. However, 20 years ago, Nadel and Moscovitch (1998) reviewed data from over 
a dozen studies on retrograde amnesia in individuals who, like H.M., had bilateral 
hippocampal damage, and showed that both claims are likely false. First, their analysis 
shows that the temporal gradient of retrograde amnesia is correlated with the severity of 
the hippocampal damage, so that only individuals with spared hippocampal tissue show 
retention of premorbid episodic autobiographical memories. When the whole hippocampal 
formation (i.e., hippocampus, subiculum, and dentate gyrus) is affected, the gradient is 
minimal, and when the entire hippocampal complex is affected (i.e., hippocampal 
formation plus entorhinal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices), it is completely flat. 
Second, retrograde and anterograde amnesia are only partially correlated, for damage to 
the hippocampus proper is sufficient to generate episodic anterograde amnesia, although it 
need not generate corresponding retrograde amnesia. Finally, as was the case with H.M., 
there is evidence of sparing of both retrograde and anterograde semantic memory, 
indicative of the relative independence of this form of declarative memory from the MTL.  
This last point is very important because it speaks not only against the SMM—
which states that the hippocampus is necessary for the encoding of all declarative 
information—but also the empirical argument, as it assumes that individuals with MTL 
amnesia are incapable of learning new facts. However, many of the studies reviewed by 
Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) suggest otherwise. For instance, the patient from Warrington 
and McCarthy (1988) showed normal memory for the meaning of premorbid and 
postmorbid words. The same occurred with a group of non-Korsakoff amnesic patients 
studied by Verfaellie and colleagues (1995), as well as Holdstock et al.’s (2002) patient, 
who was able to recognize postmorbid celebrities and famous events. But perhaps the 
strongest piece of evidence in support of the claim that semantic facts can be learned 
independently of the hippocampus, comes from well-documented cases of developmental 
amnesia. In 1997, Vargha-Khadem and collaborators reported the cases of Beth, Jon and 
Kate, all of whom had severe anoxic episodes in their childhood (at birth, 4 y/o, and 9 y/o, 
                                               
5 Other aspects of H.M.’s “textbook” neuropsychological profile have been questioned too. For instance, it has been 
suggested that H.M.’s post-operative language was affected (MacKay, Stewart, and Burke, 1998) and that his working 
memory may have been impaired too, since it was only minimally tested (Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005).  However, 
I prefer not to discuss these two observations at length, mainly because the issue about H.M’s postmorbid linguistic 
abilities is very hard to settle (see Corkin, 2013, Ch. 11), and also because the evidence regarding his working memory 
capacity is too limited.  
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respectively), leading to sustained hippocampal damage and a profound amnesia. 
However, their neuropsychological profiles show that despite very low scores in episodic 
memory tasks, their semantic memory was essentially preserved. Indeed, although 
incapable of storing new episodic information, all three were able to complete school and 
went on to live relatively normal lives. 
Further studies with neuropathological individuals cast doubt upon other tenets of 
the SMM. For instance, according to it, short term and long term memory are supported by 
distinct neural systems, as only the latter depends on the hippocampus. However, recent 
evidence suggests that while working memory for individual words and digits may be 
preserved in MTL amnesia, working memory for conjunction of items (Olson et al., 2006), 
faces and scenes (Hannula et al., 2006), and topographical landmarks (Hartley et al., 2007), 
is impaired (see Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005, for a review). Likewise, contrary to the 
SMM—according to which perception is independent of the MTL—research conducted in 
the last couple of decades has shown that individuals with hippocampal damage have 
difficulty solving perceptual discrimination tasks that involve complex and ambiguous 
scenes (Barense et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2012). Finally, contrary to SMM claim that the 
MTL exclusively subserves encoding of declarative memory, recent evidence strongly 
suggests that individuals with MTL damage have trouble in cognitive tasks outside the 
domain of declarative memory, such as episodic future (Hassabis et al, 2007) and 
counterfactual thinking (Mullally and Maguire, 2014), as well as certain tasks involved in 
social cognition (Laurita and Spreng, 2017) and mind-wandering (McCormick et al., 2018).  
What about skill learning? Surprisingly, after H.M., there have been very few 
studies specifically on skill learning in individuals with amnesia due to bilateral MTL 
damage.6 I already have discussed Cohen and Squire’s (1980) influential paper, showing 
intact learning of mirror-reading skill for non-repeated words in 14 patients. Follow-up 
studies from Squire’s group show similar results in individuals receiving electro-
convulsive therapy (Squire et al., 1984). However, once we move away from simple 
mirror-tracing and mirror-reading tasks, and away from Squire’s patients, the evidence 
becomes murkier. Charness and colleagues (1988), for instance, tested two patients on a 
novel arithmetic skill and only one of them showed improvement. Years later, Tranel and 
collaborators (1994) tested a large group of patients on rotary pursuit, mirror-tracing and 
mirror-reading tasks. However, of these patients, only three had bilateral hippocampal 
damage (of unknown extent) and their results are difficult to interpret, as they are averaged 
together with several other patients and control data is not reported. More recently, 
Heyselaar and collaborators (2017) showed syntactic priming in a group of Korsakoff 
patients; however, their control group did not show the same effect, complicating the 
comparison. More strikingly, Döhring and colleagues (2017) tested sixteen patients with 
transient global amnesia on the finger tapping task7. Although their lesions are limited to 
just one section of the hippocampus, patients did not perform at the same level as controls 
                                               
6 There are two other studies worth mentioning, one of which is the main topic of section 5. The other one is a brief report 
by Yamashita, from 1993, where three patients with bilateral hippocampal damage are compared against six controls in 
the rotary pursuit task. Unfortunately, this study is severely underpowered, and the variance in the data from both patients 
and controls is so large that it is almost impossible to interpret. 
7 Transient global amnesia (TGA) is a rare neuropsychological disorder, usually caused by a temporary anoxic lesion to 
hippocampal neurons in CA1, and it is normally reversible. During the acute phase, which lasts about 24 hours, patients 
with TGA present a profound amnesic profile, after which they recover back to baseline but without remembering 
anything of what happened during that period.  
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either during learning or during re-test within the acute phase. Only when they recovered 
from their lesion and were tested weeks later were they able to perform normally. 
A parallel line of research on neuro-rehabilitation shows similarly complex results. 
Building upon the kind of neuropsychological studies discussed here, researchers and 
clinicians have worked on evaluating therapeutic strategies to promote skill learning in 
individuals who become amnesic. In a pioneering study by Glisky, Schacter and Tulving 
(1986), four patients with different degrees of memory compromise were trained on very 
simple computer programing skills. Their results show that although there is learning, it is 
definitively not on par with controls, as patients took much longer, made more mistakes, 
and needed constant reminders—in the form of semantic information and instructions—to 
complete the tasks. Other studies have reported similar results, with learning over time but 
always qualitatively different and never at the same level as controls (e.g., Kime, Lamb 
and Wilson, 1996). Finally, to further complicate the picture, recent evidence shows that 
when we start varying certain parameters of tasks whose performance was thought to be 
independent of the hippocampus, individuals with MTL amnesia show no learning. For 
instance, as discussed in section 3.2.2., perceptual skills such as probabilistic learning, 
often measured with variants of the weather prediction task, are allegedly preserved in 
hippocampal amnesia. However, recent studies show that varying the parameters of the 
predictive regularities in the stimuli (Schapiro et al., 2014), or even the timing of the 
feedback from 1 to 8 seconds (Foerde et al., 2013), is enough to impair statistical learning 
in individuals with MTL amnesia.  
In sum, evidence from neuropathological individuals suggests that many of the core 
tenets of the SMM are likely false. First, the hippocampus seems to be needed for both the 
encoding and retrieval of episodic memories. Second, a functioning hippocampus may 
facilitate but is definitively not indispensable for learning semantic facts. Third, the 
hippocampal complex is necessary for a number of cognitive processes outside the domain 
of memory, including—but perhaps not limited to—perceptual discrimination of 
ambiguous scenes, episodic and counterfactual thinking, and working memory tasks 
involving spatial and relational information. Finally—and critical for our current 
purposes—the evidence in support of preserved skill learning in MTL amnesia is meager 
and complex, not only because it seems consistent for a very circumscribed set of tasks, 
but also because it collapses when their parameters are minimally altered.  
4.3. Conflicting behavioral and neural evidence 
 Thanks to recent developments in behavioral and neuroimaging methods, which 
allow researchers to explore brain activity associated with different memory tasks, 
evidence accrued in the last decade and a half overwhelmingly suggests that the alleged 
cognitive and neural dissociations assumed by the SMM are far from clear. I have already 
discussed some results showing hippocampal activation during visual and working 
memory tasks as a function of material, such a relational, conjunctive and spatial 
information (Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005). More recent evidence has also shown 
hippocampal activation during working memory tasks involving words (Axmacher et al, 
2010) and items arranged in 3D-grids (Hannula and Ranganath, 2008). Consistent evidence 
comes also from single cell recording studies in macaques, showing that certain neural 
signatures that were thought to index working memory processing can be recorded in 
entorhinal cortex, suggesting—contra the SMM—that neuronal populations within the 
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MTL play a very active role in the maintenance of information for short periods of time 
(Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005).  
 Neuroimaging evidence also overwhelmingly shows that hippocampal activity is 
evident during not only encoding but also retrieval of both episodic and semantic memories 
(Ryan et al, 2008). Additionally, and consistent with the results from patients, a growing 
number of neuroimaging studies have reported hippocampal and MTL activity during tasks 
outside the domain of declarative memory encoding, such as episodic future (Addis et al, 
2007) and counterfactual thinking (De Brigard et al., 2013), spatial navigation 
(Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2014), and certain kinds of perceptual tasks (Lee et al., 2012), 
among others. And this is only the tip of the neuroimaging iceberg, for the evidence 
strongly suggest that, contrary to the SMM, the hippocampal complex is not uniquely 
dedicated to the encoding of declarative memory.      
 But more critical to our purposes is the amount of recent behavioral and 
neuroimaging evidence showing that the alleged boundaries between declarative and non-
declarative memory are—as some researchers put it—rather “porous” (Dew and Cabeza, 
2011). One line of evidence, for instance, has shown significant cognitive and neural 
overlap between conceptual priming—a process typically associated with non-declarative 
memory—and familiarity—a process typically associated with episodic memory8. What 
this research has shown is that a frontal N400 effect, previously linked to familiarity, is 
also linked to conceptual priming (Voss and Federmeier, 2011). Relatedly, fMRI studies 
have shown significant overlap in rhinal cortex between familiarity and conceptual 
priming, further suggesting shared mechanisms between the two processes (Fernandez and 
Tendolkar, 2006). Additionally, a number of experimental results have shown not only that 
the hippocampus is sensitive to information previously presented relative to new 
information (Daselaar et al., 2014), but also that it may be needed to encode new relational 
information, regardless of whether such information was consciously encoded or not (Duss 
et al, 2014). That the hippocampus is recruited during the encoding of episodic information 
regardless of whether or not the subject is conscious of it goes against the very definition 
of a declarative memory system upheld by the SMM.   
 Finally, there is also plenty of evidence showing that the hippocampus and 
surrounding MTL areas are involved in the consolidation of motor skill tasks. In a 
pioneering study, Schendan et al. (2003) showed increased hippocampal activity on a SRT 
task learned both implicitly and explicitly, relative to a control condition of random 
sequence blocks. More recently, Albouy and colleagues (2008) showed the involvement of 
the hippocampus in the consolidation of a different motor sequence task, known as the 
serial oculomotor reaction time (SORT) task—whereby dots appear, one at a time, in one 
of four possible locations with sporadic changes of color. Participants are asked to detect 
color changes. However, unbeknownst to them, the transition of dots follows an ordered 
sequence, very much in the spirit of the SRT task. Their results showed not only that the 
                                               
8 Many researchers believe that episodic memories are retrieved by the combination of two relatively distinct sub-
processes: recollection and familiarity. The former is characterized as the slow, intentional retrieval of the richly 
contextual spatiotemporal information that constitute the content of our episodic memories, whereas the latter is a fast, 
unintentional retrieval of the general gist of the event that brings about a sense of having occurred in one’s own past. 
Moreover, there is now evidence of underlying neural distinctions between the two processes: while recollection has been 
associated with activity in the hippocampus proper, and has been indexed by posterior late positive components using 
event-related potentials (ERP), familiarity has been associated with activity in the rhinal cortex and with anterior early 
negative ERP components (Skinner and Fernandes, 2007) 
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hippocampus was recruited during learning but also that a hippocampus-striatum 
collaboration overnight is required for the successful consolidation of the memory for the 
motor sequence. These, along with the aforementioned results, only scratch the surface of 
a large body of evidence suggesting significant overlaps in the mechanisms involved in 
declarative and non-declarative memory.  
4.4. Reassessing the empirical argument  
Taken together, the neuropsychological, behavioral, and neuroimaging evidence 
reviewed in this section strongly suggests that many core tenets of the SMM are likely 
false. First, it is not the case that the hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas are required 
only for the encoding of declarative memories: as it turns out, these structures are also 
required to retrieve episodic memories. Second, the idea that the hippocampus is no longer 
necessary after an episodic memory has been consolidated is also wrong: functioning 
hippocampi seem indispensable to retrieve detailed episodic autobiographical memories 
regardless of their age. Third, the evidence also suggests that the hippocampus may not be 
indispensable for encoding semantic information. Fourth, contrary to the SMM claim that 
the hippocampus is exclusively involved in encoding declarative information, the evidence 
reveals that it is critical for a number of operations outside the memory domain. Fifth, and 
relatedly, this evidence also shows that a functioning hippocampus may be required for 
learning certain tasks thought to index skill learning. Finally, some of the most recent 
results suggest that processes associated with declarative memory (e.g., familiarity; 
conscious relational memory) share cognitive and neural mechanisms with processes 
associated with non-declarative memory (e.g., conceptual priming; unconscious relational 
memory).  
The scientific importance of this counterevidence against the SMM is 
unquestionable. In fact, the research community slowly but steadily has come to realize 
that this old model of memory is profoundly inaccurate, and a number of alternative models 
have been offered instead (Redder et al, 2009; Henke, 2010; Cabeza et al, 2018). But more 
important for our current purposes, this counterevidence has profound philosophical 
consequences for the debate about intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about knowing-
how, as it clearly speaks against P3 of the empirical argument. Specifically, it shows that 
there is no clear distinction between a declarative and a non-declarative system as 
stipulated by the standard model.  Moreover, the reviewed evidence speaks against specific 
empirical claims made by philosophers who support the use of the empirical argument 
against intellectualism. For instance, we have seen that it is false that H.M. “shows a normal 
or near-normal learning curve” in tasks that involve motor skills (Wallis, 2008: 133), or 
that he was “unable to form new declarative beliefs” (Ibid.)—if “declarative belief” is 
cashed out in terms of declarative (semantic) memory. Likewise, it is also not true that “the 
exercise of procedural knowledge […] involves areas dissociable from the hippocampus 
and medial temporal lobe” (Glick, 2011: 402) or that “psychologists speak with one voice” 
when stating that declarative and non-declarative knowledge are distinct (Devitt, 2011: 
213): They don’t. The SMM is inaccurate, and while the scientific evidence about the 
relationship between the mechanisms underlying skill learning and declarative memory is 
inconclusive and complex, one thing is clear: that if—as P2 states—knowledge-that is 
tantamount to declarative memory and knowledge-how is tantamount to procedural 
memory, then—contra Cohen and Squire (1980)—such distinction does not seem to be 
honored by the nervous system.  
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Advocates of the empirical argument may still want to defend a version of it on 
account that even if H.M. and other individuals with MTL amnesia could still learn new 
semantic facts, the kinds of facts that matter for intellectualism are not semantic: they are 
episodic. There are at least two problems with this reply: 1) The brain regions that 
philosophers have associated with the kind of propositional knowledge required for 
intellectualism (i.e., medial and inferior temporal lobes [Wallis, 2008; Glick, 2011]) are—
as we just saw—fundamentally involved in semantic memory. 2) Why should we accept 
that the kind of propositional knowledge relevant for intellectualism is episodic rather than 
semantic? An argument against intellectualism along these lines would need to show that 
the nature of the propositional knowledge it assumes is, in fact, episodic, not semantic. 
Alas, such an argument is not in the offing. Another possibility is to claim that, despite 
what the researchers say, H.M. and other MTL amnesiacs learn factual knowledge non-
declaratively. But this move backfires, for it would mean that the format of factual 
knowledge is such that it can be handled by the non-declarative system, which is the same 
system that handles procedural memory—a claim that undermines P2.  
Finally, another possibility is to focus on the kind of procedural learning H.M. and 
other individuals with MTL amnesia were able to achieve, and suggest that only those tasks 
really index skill learning, whereas the other tasks, which were though to measure skill 
learning, actually do not. The problem with this post hoc response is that it makes the 
relationship between the experimental tasks and the folk-psychological notion of skill 
much more mysterious than it already is. Is it true that our folk-psychological notion of 
skill includes finger tapping but excludes rotary pursuit? Does the concept of skill apply to 
learning the weather prediction task when the feedback is given within two seconds but not 
when it is given within ten? I seriously doubt that what we ordinarily mean by skill neatly 
coincides with precisely the kinds of tasks, in precisely the sorts of conditions, in which 
individuals with amnesia can reach performance equivalent to controls.  
 
5. Intellectualism vindicated? 
 In section 4 I argued that the scientific evidence does not support the empirical 
argument against intellectualism, mainly because P3 is false. Does this mean that the 
empirical evidence supports intellectualism instead? In a recent article, Stanley and 
Krakauer (2013) defend the claim that motor skills depend on knowledge of facts. In this 
a paper, they briefly discuss the results of a study by Roy and Park (2010) in a way that 
could be interpreted as providing evidence in favor of intellectualism. However, this 
interpretation is far from clear. On the one hand, if one interprets the claim that motor skills 
depend on knowledge of facts within the dialectic of the empirical argument—i.e., as 
accepting P2—then the Roy and Park study do not offer convincing evidence to the effect 
that declarative memory is necessary for motor skills. But, on the other hand, if—as Stanley 
and Krakauer seem to suggest—one reads the claim that motor skills depend on the 
knowledge of facts outside of the dialectic of the empirical argument—i.e., as rejecting 
P2—then it is not clear how to interpret such a claim empirically.    
The interesting but complex study by Roy and Park (2010) involves one patient, 
D.A., with severe bilateral hippocampal damage due to herpetic encephalitis, as well as six 
matched controls. According to the authors, the purpose of the study was “to investigate 
whether D.A.’s acquisition of novel complex tool knowledge was spared like his 
procedural memory or impaired like his declarative memory” (Roy and Park, 2010: 3029). 
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To that end, they built 15 novel complex tools—10 targets and 5 lures—using a children’s 
construction toy. Each tool was associated with a particular recipient (e.g., plastic wheel) 
with which it could interact toward a particular goal (e.g., move the wheel down a path). 
The study consisted of three 2-hour sessions (S1, S2, S3). There were three days between 
S1 and S2, and three weeks between S2 and S3. Additionally, each session had three 
phases: pre-test, training, and post-test. Memory was measured with four tests: a recall test 
in which participants were shown black and white pictures of the tools and were asked to 
remember details about them; a recognition test administered also with pictures of the tools; 
a grasp-to-command test, in which participants were asked to show how to hold the tool if 
they were going to use it; and a use-to-command test in which participants were asked to 
demonstrate how to use the tool. As such, the first two measured declarative memory, while 
the latter two evaluated procedural memory.   
[Figure 3] 
The experiment proceeded as follows. During S1 pre-test, participants were 
presented with the tools, and received all four tests. As expected, both D.A. and controls 
performed at floor, since they’ve never encountered such tools before (Figures 3A-B). 
Then they received the training, in the form of an instructional video followed by a 
demonstration and practice, until the participant was able to perform the task without 
making any errors within 90 seconds. Here, the results show that both D.A. and controls 
have comparable mean completion times (Figure 3D). Then, after a short delay involving 
in a distracting activity, participants received a post-test, identical to the pre-test. As shown 
in Figures 3A and 3B, during post-test D.A. performs at floor in the use-to-command task 
(and also in the grasp-to-command task, which isn’t depicted), whereas controls are able 
to complete the task in about 50 seconds with almost 80% accuracy. In S2 the procedure 
was just as in S1. Here, however, we see controls performing much better during the pre-
test than D.A., whose performance remains at floor. Completion time during training was, 
nevertheless, equivalent between the two (Figure 3D). Yet, after training, only controls 
showed improved performance; D.A. remained at floor. S3, however, included two 
variations relative to S1 and S2 (Figures 3A-B). First, the researchers included a recipient-
cue (RC) use-to-command trial for D.A. immediately prior to post-test. In this trial, unlike 
all other use-to-command trials, the experimenter placed the recipient in the appropriate 
position for each tool. The second change was to administer the declarative tests (i.e., the 
recall and recognition tests) immediately after the RC trial, rather than before the 
procedural tests, as was done in S1 and S2. These changes significantly altered D.A’s 
performance in two important respects. First, the RC trial improved his completion time 
and accuracy during the use-to-command post-test so that his performance was no different 
than controls. However, no such gain was observed for the other procedural task, i.e., 
grasp-to-command. Second, having the RC trial immediately prior to the functional-
associative recall tests, in which subjects were asked about the function of the tool and the 
appropriate position of the recipient, improved DA’s accuracy so that it was no different 
than controls (Figure 3C). However, no such improvement was evident for the other tests 
of declarative memory, i.e. recognition and recall tests of perceptual and functional features 
of each tool.   
Stanley and Krakauer’s brief discussion of the Roy and Park study seems to focus 
on S1 and S2, as they rightly point out that, unlike controls, D.A. was unable to even begin 
to use the novel tools in the pre- and post-tests. They also remark that he was able to 
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improve performance during training, but only if explicit instruction was provided 
throughout. Moreover, they point out, that this is no different from the way in which H.M. 
performed. Unless instruction was provided each day, prior to each task, H.M. would not 
even know how to begin the task. Consequently, they argue that neither D.A. nor H.M. was 
really able to perform motor skills, for unless they knew facts about what to do in the motor 
skill task, they would not have been able to perform it. All H.M. and D.A. show is 
improvement in motor acuity, not that they learned a new motor skill, for the latter at the 
very least requires knowing certain facts, such as what to do in order to initiate the task. 
So, they claim, motor skill depends on knowledge of facts. 
How shall we interpret this claim? Their suggestion is that motor skill is a complex 
process involving two components: the purely procedural aspect of motor acuity and a 
“knowledge component” (Stanley and Krakauer, 2013: 8). Prima facie, the point Stanley 
and Krakauer seem to be making appears to be merely semantic. After all, both Milner and 
Corkin repeatedly acknowledged that H.M. needed to be reminded of the nature of the task 
immediately prior to testing, which clearly indicates that they did not consider this explicit, 
task-related information to be constitutive of the performance they were trying to measure. 
Therefore, one may be tempted to read Stanley and Krakauer as merely trying to correct 
the historical record by making the point that what Milner and Corkin were measuring 
should have been called “motor acuity” rather than “skill”. Upon reflection, though, I think 
we should interpret Stanley and Krakauer as arguing—as did I in section 4—against the 
SMM rather than the actual neuropsychological observations of Milner and Corkin. After 
all, Stanley and Krakauer are quite right that many researchers, especially in philosophy 
(as we saw in section 2), have taken the SMM’s interpretation of H.M. and similar MTL 
patients’ data as demonstrating that the whole process of skill learning—above and beyond 
motor acuity—is completely independent of our capacity to remember facts about the 
relevant motor skill tasks.  
That being said, it is still worth wondering what they mean by the “knowledge 
component”, whether or not it is truly necessary for motor skill, and whether or not such a 
component, when combined with motor acuity, suffices for motor skill. In philosophical 
fashion Stanley and Krakauer define knowledge as, “minimally, a state with propositional 
content, one that is suitable for use in guiding action.” (Stanley and Krakauer, 2013: 1) The 
question now is whether we should interpret this “state with propositional content” as a 
declarative memory, the way in which partisans for the empirical argument interpret it (i.e., 
in agreement with P2), or whether we should construe it in some other way. Let’s explore 
the first option first, and assume that the knowledge component in Stanley and Krakauer’s 
account is to be understood as a declarative memory. Would the Roy and Park study 
provide evidence for the claim that knowledge of facts, i.e., declarative memory, is 
necessary for motor skill? My sense is that the results of S3 speak against this 
interpretation. For one, D.A. was able to reach normal performance in the task, without 
verbal instruction, when he as given the tool with the receptacle in the appropriate position, 
as in the RC trial. Was this change sufficient to trigger in D.A. a declarative memory about 
what to do to initiate the task? Alas, the evidence does not support that interpretation, for 
we don’t see an equivalent increase in performance in his declarative tests. Moreover, as 
shown in S1 and S2, if D.A. engages in a distraction task right after using the tool, and then 
receives it with the receptacle in the wrong position, he is unable to complete the task. This 
suggests that whatever information he was holding in working memory, and in virtue of 
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which he was able to initiate the action and even answer two basic questions about the task, 
was not subsequently consolidated into declarative memory. Whatever “knowledge” 
allowed him to perform the task during RC in S3 was fleeting and likely non-declarative.9 
The alternative is to reject P2 and to interpret knowledge of facts outside the 
dialectic of the empirical argument, that is, as not corresponding to declarative memory. 
Indeed, this seems to be precisely what Stanley and Krakauer advocate, when they claim 
that “just as it is a mistake to identify declarative knowledge with knowledge, it is a mistake 
to identify procedural knowledge with skill” (Ibid: 3). However, if we reject P2, and agree 
that the epistemological distinction between  knowing-how and knowing-that does not map 
onto to the scientific distinction between procedural and declarative memory, then it is 
unclear how empirical results can provide evidence in favor of intellectualism. One 
possibility, consistent with Krakauer and Stanley (2013) as well as Pavese (2018), requires 
us to think of know-how in different terms from the way in which partisans of the SMM 
have thought of skill. Specifically, it asks us to think of know-how, which is 
characteristically manifested in terms of intentional actions, as essentially requiring an 
epistemic state akin to how epistemologists think of knowledge. This alternative 
intellectualist view of know-how could potentially fit the scientific evidence better, but 
only insofar as we can provide an empirical interpretation of what the knowledge 
requirements amount to. And my sense is that, to get to that point, we would require further 
work to clarify how these terms should be operationalized in order to be empirically 
tractable (see, Pavese, this issue, for a step in this direction).  
 
6. Conclusion  
Some philosophers have employed variants of the empirical argument to support 
anti-intellectualism about knowing-how. In this paper I argued against this strategy, not 
only because the SMM is inaccurate, but also because the empirical evidence about the 
relationship between declarative and non-declarative memory is messy and inconclusive. 
In addition, I argued against interpreting “knowing facts about a motor skill task” as being 
tantamount to having declarative memories about said task. To be sure, I am not claiming 
that the argument between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism ought to be settled 
empirically. My argument is simply that if we are going to look at the sciences for evidence 
either in favor or against one of these views, we will first have to recognize that the actual 
relationship between knowledge-how and procedural memory, and knowledge-that and 
declarative memory, is neither equivalence nor unique dependency. As such, “knowing-
how” and “knowing-that” join the ever-growing set of folk-psychological notions that do 
                                               
9 Roy and Park’s motivation to include the RC trial in S3 stems from the observation that during S1 and S2 D.A. “made 
comments suggesting that he knew the function of the tool, but that he did not know how to position to recipient 
appropriately” (Roy and Park, 2010: 3031). Similar observations can be found in Corkin’s report of H.M.’s performance. 
She reports, for instance, that “at the begging of Rotary-Pursuit and Bimanual-Tracking test session he was allowed to 
look at the apparatus and then asked to describe the task. His memory for the Rotary-Pursuit task, though somewhat 
inaccurate, was consistent in specifying that he had to touch the stylus to the target in order to stop the disc from turning. 
On one occasion he further stated that he was not supposed to "touch that spring part" on the stylus, something that he 
had in fact been reminded about several times before. H.M.’s description of the Bimanual-Tracking task was consistently 
accurate from Session Ill on.” (Corkin, 1968: 264). Corking called the retention of this fragmentary information “testing 
habits”, and although she did not elaborate on the nature of this retention, it is consistent with her view that H.M.’s 
capacity to remember information about the task may have contributed to his performance, just as his deficits in 
remembering it may help to explain why his performance was never optimal.     
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not transparently correlate with constructs in cognitive psychology and neuroscience (De 
Brigard, 2006; 2014b).10 
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Figure 1: Standard Model of Memory. Adapted from Squire, 1992.  
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Figure 2: Results from H.M. vs controls’ performance in two motor-skill learning tasks, 
from Corkin 1968. A) Mean-time on target during the Rotary Pursuit task as a function of 
session/day. B) Mean-number of contacts with the target during the Rotary Pursuit task as 
a function of session/day. C) Mean-time on target during Bimanual Tracking as a function 
of session/day. D) Contact-scores during Bimanual Tracking as a function of session/day. 
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Figure 3: Results from D.A. vs controls’ performance in the novel tools task, from Roy 
and Park, 2010. A) Mean completion time in the use-to-command test. B) Percent correct 
in the use-to-command test. C). Percentage of correct responses in recall of functional 
associative information by test trial. D) Mean completion time during training sessions 
across stages. Error bars indicate SEM.  
 
 
